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Abstract — The physics literature contains many claims that ultrashort-lived unstable
particles, such as a Higgs boson, have been observed. These claims are a matter of applying
the 5σ-convention in particle physics. This paper, however, shows that by applying this
5σ-convention a category mistake is made, by which a pure reasoning is passed off as an
observation. Not only are these two fundamentally different primitive notions at the very
basis of science, but the pure reasoning in question is also weaker than an observation:
what we have in each case is that the existence of the ultrashort-lived unstable particle is
inferred to the best explanation, but that does absolutely not merit the stronger claim that
the particle in question has been “observed”. Consequently, the observational claims in
question will thus have to be dismissed as overstatements. On a general note, this demon-
strates that the empirical support for the Standard Model of particle physics is significantly
less than hitherto thought.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, claims have surfaced in the physics literature that ultrashort-lived unstable
particles, postulated by the Standard Model c.q. in the framework of the Standard Model,
have been “observed”. Examples are the claims regarding the Higgs boson [1, 2, 3], the W±
bosons [4], the Z0 boson [5, 6], the Y-meson [7], the J/Ψ meson [8], the Ω−b baryon [9], and the
tetraquark Z(4430)− [10]. It is then important to realize that the use of the word ‘observation’
(sometimes replaced by ‘discovery’, meaning ‘first-time observation’) is the key aspect of these
papers: it is therefore that the existence of these particles is widely believed to be confirmed.
The method by which physicists reach the conclusion that the sought-after ultrashort-lived
unstable particle has been “observed” is the same in all cases. Experimentally, each decay
mode of the ultrashort-lived unstable particle is analyzed separately: by each such analysis one
tests the hypothesis ‘predicted-decay-products-exist’ versus the hypothesis ‘no-predicted-decay-
product’. E.g. in the hunt for the Higgs boson, the diphoton mass spectrum shown in Fig.
1 was obtained in the analysis of the decay mode H → γγ: one then accepts the hypothesis
‘the 125 GeV photon pairs predicted by Higgs decay exist’, and rejects the hypothesis ‘the
predicted 125 GeV photon pairs do not exist’. If all goes well, the conjunction of accepted
hypotheses obtained from the analyses yields the intermediate conclusion that the predicted
decay products of the ultrashort-lived unstable particle have been observed with a significance
of 5σ. None of this is questioned: the calculations involved in deriving testable predictions, the
experimental work itself and the statistical analyses of the experimentally obtained data are all
state-of-the-art. But the problematic step comes thereafter: from this intermediate conclusion
physicists reach the final conclusion that the ultrashort-lived unstable particle itself has been
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Figure 1: Diphoton mass spectrum obtained in
the hunt for the Higgs boson. The lower curve
with the peak at around 125 GeV is obtained
from the upper one by substraction. Source:
CERN Document Server.
observed by applying the following convention in particle physics, which will henceforth be
called the ‘5σ-convention’:
the observation of an ultrashort-lived unstable particle can be claimed if the condition
is satisfied that its predicted decay products have been observed with a significance of
5σ.
The purpose of this paper is to show that when this 5σ-convention is applied, a pure reasoning
is passed off as an observation—two primitive notions at the very basis of science that since
long have been established to be fundamentally different, e.g. by the now historical works of
Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Hume, Locke and the likes thereof. So, applying this 5σ-convention
yields a wrong use of primitive notions of science—it yields a category mistake, which has
nothing to do with measurement or calculation, but which overstates results.
2 Methodology
Physicists at CERN have been confronted with the criticism in [11] that the 5σ-convention
doesn’t resonate with recent philosophical insights in what it means to have observed some-
thing [12, 13], but the reply was that the physicists’ use of the term ‘observation’ should not
be confused with potentially different definitions of ‘observation’ in philosophy (D. Schlatter,
CERN, personal communication). So, to prove that what physicists call an “observation” of an
ultrashort-lived unstable particle is not an observation at all, below it will be proved that the
condition laid down in the 5σ-convention is insufficient for an observational claim regarding
an ultrashort-lived unstable particle. That can be done by a standard method. The logical
form of the 5σ-convention is, namely, that of an implication
S ⇒ C (1)
where the proposition letter ‘C’ stands for the desired conclusion that the observation of the
ultrashort-lived unstable particle X can be claimed, and ‘S’ for the (allegedly) sufficient con-
dition for that claim, being that the predicted decay products have been observed with a
significance of 5σ. To prove that the condition S is insufficient, it suffices to prove implications
C ⇒ N (2)
S ⇒ ¬N (3)
for some proposition N : Eq. (2) means that N is a necessary condition for C, and Eq. (3)
means that this necessary condition N is not satisfied when S is satisfied—that proves that the
allegedly sufficient condition S is insufficient, and thus that the 5σ-convention is inadequate.
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3 Result: the argument against the 5σ-convention
We first identify a necessary condition for an observational claim. The point is then this:
regardless of how we define the term ‘observation’ precisely, the crux is that it is an act of the
senses. Consequently, the following implication is true:
if it can be claimed that X has been observed, then it is necessarily true that X
exists—that is, then the real world can only be a world in which X exists, and not
one in which X does not exist
This implication will henceforth be called ‘the major’: Eq. (2) expresses its logical form, with
the proposition letter ‘N ’ standing for ‘it is necessarily true that X exists’—this is, thus, a
necessary condition for any observational claim. (This major also holds for observations of
other things than ultrashort-lived unstable particles.)
It can be proven by reductio ad absurdum that this indeed is a necessary condition. Suppose
that we deny the major: that would be admitting to the possibility that we can claim that X
has been observed, while X does not exist. That is patently absurd. In a similar vein, Kant
argued that we must realize that if we perceive a phenomenon, there must be a thing in itself
whose appearance we perceive; “[f]or, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of
an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd” (preface to the 2nd
edition of Critique of Pure reason, 1787). That proves that the denial of the above major leads
to an absurdity: the major can, thus, not be denied—those who nevertheless deny the major
are cordially invited on an expedition to spot a unicorn: if existence of a thing is not needed
for its observation, we might spot one.
Proceeding, we now prove that the necessary condition for an observational claim identified
above is not satisfied when the allegedly sufficient claim of the 5σ-convention is satisfied. In
other words, we now prove that the following implication, which will henceforth be called ‘the
minor’, is true:
if the predicted decay products of the ultrashort-lived unstable particle X have been
observed with a significance of 5σ, then it is not necessarily true that X exists—that
is, then the real world can be a world in which X exists, but also one in which X
does not exist
Eq. (3) thus expresses the logical form of this minor. So, suppose that we have observed what
can be described as the predicted decay products of the ultrashort-lived unstable particle X,
with a significance of 5σ. We then have to admit the simple truths (i) that X itself has never
been the sensum, i.e. the thing being sensed, in an act of the senses, and (ii) that the existence
of X is not logically implied by the empirical data. So, we are left with inference to the best
explanation (IBE), which is an act of pure reasoning : the only conclusion that we can draw
is that the existence of the ultrashort-lived unstable particle X is the best explanation for the
empirical data. But that means that it is not necessarily true that the ultrashort-lived unstable
particle X exists: the empirical data by themselves, namely, admit both a real world in which
the observed particles exist and X exists, and a real world in which the observed particles exist
but X does not exist. We may reason that the first possibility is currently the best explanation
of the empirical data, but—regardless of how much we want this to be true—by no means does
this exclude the second possibility. To illustrate this with an example, consider the case of the
Higgs boson. This has the essential property P that it ‘gives mass’ to other particles. But this
property P is not reflected in its decay products: from merely observing the decay products, it
cannot be logically concluded that the source is an ultrashort-lived unstable particle X with
the property P—the decay products may also have originated from a particle X ′ that has the
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same decay reactions as the Higgs boson but not the property P . So, even though the existence
of the Higgs boson is the best explanation now, the empirical data by themselves still admit
the possibility that it does not exist. Concluding, even though the allegedly sufficient claim of
the 5σ-convention is satisfied, we are forced to admit that it is not necessarily true that the
ultrashort-lived unstable particle X exists. That proves the minor—it is emphasized that this
minor obtains from an analysis of the mere concept of IBE.
It is important to realize that we engage in circular reasoning if we deny the minor—to deny
the minor is to hold the view, expressed by the conjunction S ∧N , that an observation of the
predicted decay products of the ultrashort-lived unstable particle X goes hand in hand with the
presence of the ultrashort-lived unstable particle X in the system under observation. What we
have is that the analysis of the experimental data reveals that (an excess of) certain particles
with certain properties must have been present in the system under observation, but the crux is
that the analysis in itself doesn’t reveal anything else: we may describe the observed particles
as the predicted decay products of the ultrashort-lived unstable particle X, but it remains to
be proven that the existence of the ultrashort-lived unstable particle X is the cause of their
presence. So, if we take the position expressed by the conjunction S ∧N , then we have tacitly
assumed what has to be proven: we have, then, engaged in circular reasoning. So, the minor
cannot be denied. This circular reasoning also obtains when we call it an indirect observation
of X: knowledge of the cause of the observed phenomenon is then, namely, presupposed [13].
(The circular reasoning can be laid bare in a suitable frame for modal propositional logic, but
that’s beyond the scope of this paper.)
Using standard propositional logic, the inevitable conclusion that can be drawn from the major
and the minor is then the following implication:
if the predicted decay products of the ultrashort-lived unstable particle X have been
observed with a significance of 5σ, then it cannot be claimed that X has been observed
The logical form of this conclusion is then expressed by the implication
S ⇒ ¬C (4)
in which the proposition letters ‘S’ and ‘C’ have the same meaning as above; it follows straight
from Eqs. (2) and (3). That establishes as a fact that the 5σ-convention is inadequate—the
allegedly sufficient condition S is insufficient for an observational claim. So, by applying the
5σ-convention a category mistake is made: what has actually been done is that the existence of
X has been inferred on the basis of IBE, which is an act of pure reasoning, but this is (wrongly)
passed off as an observation of X—that is, as an inference of the existence of X on the basis of
an act of the senses. The crux is that X has never been the ‘sensum’ in an act of the senses!
4 Discussion: replies by physicists and philosophers
Below three replies—the first by a top philosopher and the last two by top physicists—to the
above argument against the 5σ-convention are discussed. The replies are paraphrased.
Reply 1. The paper is correct. Yes, high energy physicists use the term ‘observation’ in a
misleading way in this context. But philosophically, the argument is not interesting.
This assessment is more or less correct: the purpose of this paper is merely to show that the
use of the word ‘observation’ by physicists is wrong—at least, in so far as it concerns claims
that ultrashort-lived unstable particles have been “observed”. The purpose of this paper is
thus not to advance a more general philosophical discussion: consequently, this paper will be
not interesting for those interested in more general philosophical discussions.
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Reply 2. This is not worthy of further consideration by physicists, because it is a mere epis-
temological treatise on the cognizability of short-lived particles such as the Higgs boson.
The assessment, that this is a mere epistemological treatise on the cognizability of short-lived
particles, is also more or less correct. That, however, does not make the argument any less true.
The point is that physicists are the ones who have used the term ‘observation’ wrongfully, and
therefore the critical discussion about that word use has to be held with physicists. Furthermore,
since existential knowledge in physics, that is, knowledge that this or that exists, derives from
observations, the obvious risk of this wrong use of terminology is the creation of a body of
pseudoknowledge—i.e. a body of statements that is falsely believed to be a body of knowledge.
Therefore, there is no point in postponing a critical discussion any further.
Reply 3. I don’t have the impression that this teaches physicists anything new. The author is
correct when saying that an inference to the best explanation is involved; but everyone knows
that. But if we are confident that the Higgs boson is the actual cause of the observed decay
products, then we can be confident that we have indirectly observed the Higgs boson.
This physicist has missed the whole point of the presented argument: if you have merely
inferred that the ultrashort-lived unstable particle X exists because it is the best explanation
for the observations, then you cannot pass that off as an observation of the ultrashort-lived
unstable particle X regardless of the degree of confidence that you have that these particles are
the cause of the observed phenomenon. By the same token, it cannot be claimed that on the
photo in Fig. 2 below we “observe” government complicity in the 9/11 atrocities, regardless
of one’s degree of confidence that government complicity is the actual cause of the straight cut
of the column. In both cases, a reasoning is passed off as an observation. So only by lowering
the standard of quality required for contributions to the scientific discourse we can allow the
claim that a Higgs boson has been “observed”—but then we will also have to allow the claim
that government complicity in the 9/11 atrocities has been “observed”!
Figure 2: Photograph taken after col-
lapse of the WTC towers. Enclosed
in the yellow circle is a column with a
straight cut. Source: public domain.
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5 Conclusions
First of all, this paper has proven that that 5σ-convention, on which claims that ultrashort-
lived unstable particles have been “observed” are based, is inadequate. The validity of this
conclusion depends on nothing else than on the validity of two premises: the only way to prove
that the present paper is incorrect is, thus, to prove that one of its premises is incorrect. But
clear reasons have been given why the premises cannot be denied.
Furthermore, this is not a word game: the inadequateness of the 5σ-convention has far
reaching implications, not the least of which is that all observational claims based thereon
have to be dismissed as overstatements. Inferring the existence of an ultrashort-lived unstable
particle X on the basis of IBE is, namely, much weaker than inferring the existence of X on the
basis of an act of the senses: in the latter case it necessarily true that X exists in the system
under observation, but in the former case it isn’t. And because of this non-equivalence, none of
the ultrashort-lived unstable particles postulated by the Standard Model can be claimed to have
been observed—at best it can be claimed in each case that the predictions of the Standard
Model (including the ultrashort-lived unstable particle X) have been confirmed, which is a
substantially different claim. Ergo, the empirical support for the Standard Model of particle
physics is significantly less than currently thought!
The present argument is strictly limited to observational claims concerning ultrashort-lived
unstable particles: by no means is this intended to be applied to observational claims concerning
things, living or lifeless, that can be directly observed—e.g. ‘cows exist’. However, the physics
literature contains many more observational claims that in fact are category mistakes in which
the observation of a thing and the inference of the existence of a thing based on IBE have been
confused; a recent example is the claimed observation of a gravitational wave [14], which led
to the award of the 2017 Nobel prize in physics. The recommendation is therefore to reassess
observational claims in the physics literature.
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